Barrif on Berachain
  • 🐻Bariffβ€” Onchain Wars
  • INTRODUCTION
    • ⛓️Abstract
    • ⛓️Core Mechanics
    • πŸ’§Liquidity Pool & Incentives
    • πŸ“ŠFee Dynamics
  • LBE & TOKENOMICS
    • πŸ’§Liquidity Bootstrapping Event
    • πŸͺ™Tokenomics
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  • 1. Tuple Token Design: CHINA vs. USA
  • 2. Dynamic Minting & Perpetual Leverage
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  1. INTRODUCTION

Core Mechanics

PreviousAbstractNextLiquidity Pool & Incentives

Last updated 1 month ago

The Bariff ecosystem is built around several components that make memeFi happen in a safe, elegant, and dynamic way. At its core, the protocol features two mutually correlated tokens, CHINA and USA, each with the following characteristics:

1. Tuple Token Design: CHINA vs. USA

  • CHINA: Communist-oriented, BERA-backed metastable memecoin, minted with BERA as collateral.

  • USA: capitalism-oriented, BERA-backed metastable memecoin, minted with BERA as collateral.

  • Both tokens exist in a K-equilibrium, where their combined value follows:

    • As CHINA demand increases, USA’s price adjusts to maintain balance.

    • As USA demand increases, CHINA’s price dynamically compensates.

2. Dynamic Minting & Perpetual Leverage

2.1 Minting as a Long/Short Mechanism

  • Users deposit BERA to mint either CHINA or USA, effectively longing one asset while shorting the other one, without a fixed period of time.

  • Burning CHINA allows minting USA (and vice versa), enabling strategic arbitrage.

  • Minting fees dynamically adjust based on price disparities, ensuring metastability.

2.2 Price-Based Dynamic Minting Fee

The key for protocol sustainability is implementing dynamic collateral in response to excessive price divergence. In that sense, we can introduce a new concept called dynamic LTV mechanism, that adjusts based on the relative price difference between Token A (CHINA) and Token B (USA).

The standard Loan-to-Value is 80% when the price of A and B are close. As the price divergence increases, the LTV decreases, forcing borrowers to adjust their collateral. This prevents over-leverage in unstable conditions and reduces the systematic risk.

2.3 Defining Dynamic LTV Function

Let,

  • PAP_APA​ and PBP_BPB​ be the prices of tokens A and B.

  • Ξ”P=βˆ₯PAβˆ’PBβˆ₯\Delta P = \|P_A-P_B\|Ξ”P=βˆ₯PAβ€‹βˆ’PB​βˆ₯ be the absolute price difference.

  • LTVb=80%LTV_b=80\%LTVb​=80% be teh default LTV when PA=PBP_A=P_BPA​=PB​.

  • LTVmLTV_mLTVm​ be the minimum LTV allowed.

  • kkk be a sensitive factor controlling how fast LTV drops.

  • DMD_MDM​ the divergence threshold, which defines when the LTV reaches its minimum.

A simple way to adjust LTV is:

LTV=max⁑(LTVm,LTVbβˆ’kβ‹…(Ξ”Pmin⁑(PA,PB)))LTV = \max\left(LTV_m, LTV_b - k \cdot \left(\frac{\Delta P}{\min(P_A, P_B)}\right)\right) LTV=max(LTVm​,LTVbβ€‹βˆ’kβ‹…(min(PA​,PB​)Ξ”P​))

Where:

  • If Ξ”P\Delta PΞ”P is small, LTV remains at 80%.

  • If Ξ”P\Delta PΞ”P exceeds a predefined threshold, LTV approaches 60%.

  • k determines how aggresively LTV is reduced as price difference grows.

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